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Political analysts predict that the struggle for seats in the State Duma will be not only 
obstinate but also ruthless. Bribes, libel, blackmail and even murder are expected to 
play a role in the election process. According to the Russian Constitution, the Duma is a 
relatively weak legislative body, but the deputies have convinced themselves more than 
once that this organ may provide them with ultimate immunity from law enforcement 
measures. Under present Russian conditions, the term "immunity" of Duma members is 
interpreted as impunity for breaking the law, impunity for embezzlement and even for 
murder. Since its creation in 1993, the present Duma has not allowed a single criminal 
investigation of any of its members. Parliamentary immunity has prevented 
investigations against Sergei Stankevich, accused of bribery, and against Sergei 
Mavrodi, suspected of embezzlement, as well as barring the murder charges that were 
to be brought against Duma member Viktor Sorochkin (subsequently also murdered).
Experts suggest that at least 10 percent of the deputies in the present parliament have 
strong ties to Russia's criminal world and it is feared that this percentage will be much 
higher in the new Duma. The prospect of winning a seat in parliament becomes even 
more enticing since the new members' mandates will be extended from two- to four-year 
terms. This extension provides a major incentive for those who are tied to shadow 
enterprises and to crime. Consequently, the stakes in contending for seats are high. 
However, the fierce contest for parliamentary seats will take place in relatively confined 
political parameters. If, yesterday, politicians who had lost a campaign were still able to 
maintain their visibility on the streets, by holding rallies or organizing demonstrations; 
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today it is almost certain that the losers in elections are doomed to become "political 
corpses."
Where Are Left and Right?
More than 260 parties have been registered with the Russian Ministry of Justice. 
Surveys and polls suggest that the Russian electorate is not really well acquainted with 
any of the parties, movements or blocs. Parties with higher visibility include the Liberal-
Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR - Vladimir Zhirinovsky), the Communist Party of the 
Russian Federation (CPRF - Gennadi Zyuganov), and Yabloko (Grigori Yavlinsky). 
However, only between 30 and 35 percent of the population are familiar even with these 
three political formations. Between 17 and 20 percent have heard of Russia's 
Democratic Choice (RDC - Yegor Gaidar), of the Russian Agrarian Party (RAP - Mikhail 
Lapshin), and of Russia's Women (Ekaterina Lakhova). Ten percent of the electorate 
know of Democratic Russia (Lev Ponomarev), the Russian Democratic Party (RDP - 
Sergei Glaz'yev, and Stanislav Govorukhin), and Forward Russia! (Boris Fedorov). Less 
than five percent of the population are familiar with other political parties. It is 
noteworthy that this poll was conducted prior to the creation of the two "centrist" blocs -- 
Our Home is Russia (OHR - Viktor Chernomyrdin) and Ivan Rybkin's bloc (still without a 
name).
It is almost impossible to locate all the fluctuating components of Russian politics on the 
traditional political axis, where the left, the right, and the center represent clear and 
stable political entities and agendas. The notions of "right" and "left" in Russia are 
constantly switching places. The greatest difficulty in placing parties on the traditional 
axis derives from the inconsistencies in their programs. A party might publish a political 
agenda which would be contradicted by the speeches of its leader; the political 
aspirations of the latter might be unrelated both to agendas and to speeches. In this 
context, Zhirinovsky comes to mind, whose "liberal democrats" have nothing in common 
either with democracy or with liberalism.
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Another reason why it is so difficult to define different political blocs relates to the 
eclectic nature of their ideologies--or simply a lack thereof. Furthermore, all the parties 
are eager to convince the electorate that they are striving for "a socially oriented 
economy"; in other words every leader is trying to portray him or herself as a social 
democrat. Zhirinovsky particularly exploits this term. Finally, all the politicians are 
promising to build a strong state and to resurrect Russia's "greatness." Therefore, the 
political axis should be viewed as a relative notion. Perhaps a paradigm of two axes -- 
one with respect to the social orientation of the parties, their perception of democracy, 
and their attitude toward the market, and the other, related to "patriotism," the "national 
idea," and "statehood" --would allow a somewhat clearer distinction of Russia's political 
forces.
The Axis of "Social Orientation"
On the very left flank stand the controversial figure of Eduard Limonov and his dwarf-
party of national-Bolsheviks, as well as Viktor Anpilov, the leader of the street vandals 
and drunkards organized in the Labor Russia party. The Bolsheviks led by Nina 
Andreeva are also clustered at the same end. These groups represent Russia's political 
rabble and have no realistic chance in the elections. However, there are more serious 
candidates on the left. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) 
numbers more than 500,000 members, according to its leader Zyuganov. With a 
powerful net of regional organizations, Zyuganov's party is the best organized. The 
results from recent regional elections showed that the communists should not be 
underestimated, since they won in most of the areas. However, their "Achilles heel" is 
the crisis of their ideology. It is not easy to reconcile the old communist ideas (which are 
still very much supported by party members) with the realities established by the market 
economy. It would also have to bring into accord ideas of "proletarian internationalism" 
and of "patriotism" as well as reconciling ideas of "private property" and "social equality."
A little closer to the center, but still very close to Zyuganov, stand the agrarians. The 
Russian Agrarian Party (Lapshin) constitutes one of the larger groups in the present 
Duma. The backbone of this party consists of the leaders of Russian collective farms, 
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on whom the population of the countryside remains entirely dependent. The inhabitants 
of the countryside will vote for whomever they are told to support. The communists and 
the agrarians do not need to form a single bloc in the upcoming Duma elections: Both 
parties know that they can count on each other when it comes to contesting the single-
member okrugs (districts). They will always agree between themselves whose 
candidates will contest which okrug, and they will always vote as a bloc in the Duma 
and probably also in the upcoming presidential elections, scheduled for next June. Both 
are nostalgic about the past and are striving for its revival, although in a somewhat 
revised version. Each also advocates the return of a "state-regulated and planned 
economy."
Those who call themselves social democrats (led by Lyudmila Valtazarova and 
Aleksandr Yakovlev) may be placed closer to the center on this axis. Their number, 
however, is relatively low, as is their popularity; therefore it is unrealistic to assume that 
they will have a viable chance in the elections. A party with a similar profile, but with 
considerably higher visibility, is the Party of Self-Governing Workers, whose leader, 
Svetoslav Fedorov, a world-renowned ophthalmologist, declares that labor unions 
(collectives) should have property rights. Although his narrow political appeal is unlikely 
to draw very many voters, leaders like Fedorov are becoming more popular. The public 
admires distinguished professionals who know how to do their job, and instinctively 
hopes that they could demonstrate the same level of professionalism in politics.
The "center" in the Russian political spectrum is a concept that lacks clarity. Assuming 
that "centrists" are the forces that avoid the extremes in politics, there are two political 
blocs which view themselves in this manner. The Kremlin advisors Georgi Satarov and 
Mark Urnov have proposed and structured a "right center" and a "left center." The 
speaker of the Duma, Rybkin, was chosen to preside over the "left center," immediately 
identified as "the second party of power" that would play opposition to the Chernomyrdin 
bloc--viewed as "the first party of power." Regardless of the fact that Boris Yel'tsin had 
announced that he associated himself with both blocs, from the first days of its creation 
Rybkin's bloc proved to be a weak alternative to the "right center" since it lacked a new 
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ideology and appropriate tactics for the campaign. His bloc's performance turned out to 
be just another repetition of old slogans and ideas. Despite Rybkin's considerable 
popularity as a politician, his bloc continues to be depleted. Initially it was composed 
mostly of small parties with a social-democratic orientation, plus the official labor unions, 
but the unions recently have announced that they are leaving the bloc and would run 
either as "independents" or together with communists in the single-member 
constituencies. Rybkin's position was weakened when General Boris Gromov first joined 
the bloc and then left it. Gromov's popularity derives from the fact that he had dared to 
criticize Pavel Grachev for his actions in the Chechen campaign. However, even with 
him, the chances of the "left center" had been quite slim.
The "right center." Our Home is Russia (OHR) led by Chernomyrdin, has higher ratings, 
especially after defusing the Budennovsk hostage crisis. His bloc unites representatives 
of regional and Moscow government administrations as well as heads of large state 
enterprises. The nomenklatura has never been liked in Russia, and Chernomyrdin's 
political formation was immediately viewed as "the party of bosses." Whether liked or 
disliked, OHR has all the tools to organize a strong campaign; it could manipulate the 
elections, starting with the enormous financial resources it has at its disposal and 
ending with its ability to falsify election results (since the electoral commissions are 
appointed by the administration). OHR claims that it is for moderate speed with regard 
to economic reforms and it promises stability--slogans that seem attractive to the 
electorate. This bloc constitutes an admixture of parties, ranging from communists to 
radical entrepreneurs. In other words, the idea for a coalition government is embedded 
in this political group a priori, along with the potential for a subsequent break-up into 
small mutually hostile factions. A loose coalition in the Russian Duma is doomed to be 
ineffectual. The country needs politicians who can build a strong team in order to carry 
out reforms. OHR's appearance provoked the consolidation of new political groups to 
form a strong opposition to the Chernomyrdin bloc. In many instances some democrats 
have united with communists and even with "patriots" to fight this "enemy." 
Nevertheless, political analysts predict victory for Our Home is Russia, which they think 
would attract 15-20 percent of the votes.
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Yabloko could be placed near OHR on this axis. Yavlinsky campaigns for the 
continuation of reforms with an emphasis on manufacturers' rights. This party does not 
have a broad network of regional organizations; however, Yavlinsky's personal ratings 
do not fall far below the most popular leader, General Aleksander Lebed'. Yabloko, 
which refused to unite with Yegor Gaidar's Russia's Democratic Choice, will enter the 
election campaign as an independent party. It is impossible to discover differences in 
their programs, but Yavlinsky, who has always been in opposition to the government, is 
unwilling to share the responsibility for Gaidar's period of reforms.
Also ideologically akin to Yabloko is the movement Forward Russia! led by Boris 
Fedorov--a former RDC leader. Both Fedorov and Yavlinsky are fierce critics of the 
present government as well as of OHR. Yabloko and Forward Russia! have failed to 
merge only because of the personal political ambitions of their leaders. Gaidar's position 
in this picture is quite unique. On the one hand, he supports the government's policy 
while, on the other hand, he opposes the Chechen campaign. The latter was the reason 
why Fedorov indicated support for RDC. Nevertheless, Gaidar's party is in dire straits 
nowadays; some of its regional organizations have left and joined OHR. Those which 
did not join OHR have no chance to pass the five percent barrier, without which it is 
impossible to secure seats from the "federal list" (the 225 mandates of which are 
allocated by proportional representation); of course, seats may still be won in some of 
the 225 single-member constituencies. Apparently, RDC will have to team up with 
someone else in the campaign, and it would not be surprising if it chooses OHR.
Finally, the far right end of the axis is occupied by the Party for Economic Freedom 
(PEF) and its leader Konstantin Borovoi. Only this party had the courage to state that its 
goal is to "build capitalism." Naturally, such a straight admission has doomed its 
chances for success in the elections.
It would be futile even to attempt to find a place on this axis for the various and 
numerous "patriotic" parties, primarily because their views on economic reforms and the 
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market are utterly unclear. The "patriotic forces," however, require separate attention 
since their influence is constantly growing.
The Axis of "Patriotism"
This axis includes political groups ranging from extreme radical "nationalists" to more 
moderate "patriots." Political parties that play or manipulate the patriotic card seem to 
be attracting the electorate more and more. The extremists in this spectrum are the 
fascists, consisting of the Party of Russian National Unity (PRNU - Aleksandr 
Barkashov), the Russian National Republican Party (RNRP - Nikolai Lysenko), and the 
Russian National Council (RNC - Aleksandr Sterligov, a former KGB general). Despite 
the fact that these parties are in constant conflict with one another, they might unite over 
their shared ideology: All of them abhor the West, hate foreigners, and divide nations 
between superior (the Russians) and inferior peoples (all the rest). The former democrat 
Sergei Baburin, who leads the Russian National Union (RNU), should also be included 
in this group. It is unlikely that the radical-nationalists will have much of a chance in the 
parliamentary elections. Their extremism shocks and repels rather than attracting 
attention. Most of their followers, however, are among the younger generation; 
therefore, it would not be wise to discount these "brown" parties entirely.
Zhirinovsky and his party of "liberal democrats" is not very distant from the radical 
nationalists on the "patriotic axis." Today his party is less powerful than before. Its leader 
no longer has the allure of the new unorthodox politician; he has become far too 
annoying with his posturing and theatrics in the Duma and elsewhere. However, 
Zhirinovsky's popularity is unshaken in many large cities, especially in the southern 
parts of Russia. Unlike the rest of the radicals, the LDPR claims to favor equality for the 
nationalities in the country, but at the same time declares that the Russian people 
should be viewed as "first among equals." Occasionally Zhirinovsky may become 
involved in heated polemics with Zyuganov and other communists, but the results of the 
regional elections showed that he does not mind uniting with them when victory is at 
stake.
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There is a point on this axis where "patriots" turn into "statesmen." The Derzhava (State 
Power) party, led by Aleskandr Rutskoi the former vice president and a former prisoner 
after the failed 1993 coup, is still popular. He travels around the country, giving dramatic 
speeches full of promises to restore order. The center of his rhetoric is that Russia, as a 
state, is superior to the West. Based on this assumption, Rutskoi promises the 
electorate to "bring the West to its knees." Derzhava and LDPR have a lot in common, 
and it would not be surprising for Rutskoi's party to obtain seats in the Duma if it 
manages to team up with a powerful bloc in the election campaign.
The Congress of Russia's Communities (CRC) unites more moderate and balanced 
"patriots" and "statesmen." CRC's influence and popularity was considerably increased 
when General Lebed' joined it. If elections were to take place today, this party's victory 
might be overwhelming. However, time is not on Lebed's side. After leaving the 14th 
Army in Dniester, his former image as a fearless Grachev opponent does not fit his 
civilian clothes anymore. The main theme in the CRC program is that (Russian) 
compatriots living in the "near abroad" and their rights must be protected. However, the 
strength of this organization lies not in its political agenda, but rather in Lebed's 
personality.
Indeed, one of the main characteristics of the upcoming elections is the fact that voters 
will not be giving their support to parties, but to personalities. According to a recent poll 
conducted by the "Public Opinion Fund" concerning who should be Russia's president, 
respondents chose Lebed' by a large margin. When the name of the former general was 
coupled with another politician the results came out as follows:
Lebed'-38%; Yel'tsin-8%
Lebed'-42%; Zhirinovsky 11%
Lebed'-33%; Yavlinsky 20%
Lebed'-31%; Chernomyrdin 23%
(the rest of the respondents were undecided)
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Election day is the only time when power will be in the hands of the people. It is already 
clear that half of the eligible voters will not use this power. The masses have lost hope 
and trust in politics, and their disappointment has led to apathy. The Duma elections are 
just a prelude to the presidential race. The results in December will provide an indicator 
of whether presidential elections will take place on time and in accordance with the 
Constitution.
Note:
1. Yabloko's title might require change since Yuri Boldyrev, the "B" in the name, has left 
the party.
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